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NOTES
FEDERAL VENUE OF OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY
"BEGUN" IN ONE DISTRICT AND
"COMPLETED" IN ANOTHER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States requires that criminal
trials be held in the state and district wherein the offense was
committed.1 The offense for a continuing crime is committed
in each district wherein the alleged acts were performed.?
Consequently there may be more than one place of trial or
venue for continuing offenses. Section 3237 (a) of Title 18,
United States Code, provides for the multiple-venue of this
type of offense.
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment
of Congress, any offense against the United States begun
in one district and completed in another, or committed in
more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted
in any district in which such offense was begun, contin-
ued, or completed.. ."
The problem is what offenses warrant application of the
continuing offense or multiple-venue statute. Since the pur-
pose of the statute is to broaden venue provisions, "if a statute
defining a criminal offense has its own venue provisions,
which are broader than the venue provisions of § 3237 (a), the
venue provisions of the specific statute are applicable. ' '4 A
1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. VI. See United States v.
Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 473 (1910)
"The right secured by Art. III, § 2 of, and the Sixth Amendment to, the Con-
stitution is the right of trial in the district where the crime shall have been
committed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 provides for prosecution in both the dis-
trict and division where the alleged offense was committed.
2. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958). Venue under the Federal
Constitution is viewed as a personal right to the defendant and may be
waived. Levine v. U.S., 182 F.2d 556, 558-59 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 921 (1951). Contra, United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 609 (D. Ore.
1947). See also United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
where request for transfer under Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b) was held a waiver
of venue.
3. 62 Stat. 826 (1948). 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) 1958. Fed. R. Crim. P. 18-22
provide rules for transferring venue. Rule 21(b) allows transfer to an-
other district only when offense was partially committed In the transferee
district.
"The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the
proceeding as to him to another district or division if it appears
from the indictment or information or from a bill of particulars
that the offense was committed in more than one district or
division and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice
the proceeding should be transferred to another district or division
in which the commission of the offense is charged."
For an interesting analysis of Fed. 1. Crim. P. 21(b) see Orfield,
Transfer of Federal Offenses Committed In More than One District or
Division, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 31 (1952).
4. United States v. Bushwick Mills, Inc., 165 F.2d 198 (2nd Cir. 1948).
See Annot., 5 L. Ed. 2d 973, 974 (1961).
recent decision held that the broad provisions of the multiple-
venue statute supersede the narrower venue provisions within
a criminal statute.
5
All crimes against the federal government are statutory
crimes.6 In the absence of specific venue provisions the locus
delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime al-
leged and the location of the act or acts constituting it, and
thus proper venue. 7 For a single offense which occurs clearly
and distinctly in only one district there is no problem of deter-
mining venue. But in those cases where more than one district
is involved, as where the crime is alleged to have begun in one
district and completed in another, the construction of the
criminal statute to determine what the offense is and where
it was committed is vital for the proper laying of venue.
The scope of this article will be limited to a discussion and
analysis of cases involving offenses allegedly begun in one
district and completed in another. The second section will
discuss venue analysis for the offense of filing a false non-
communist affidavit in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
third section will include general venue determination in ana-
logous false filing cases.
II. FILING OF FALSE STATEMENTS IN VIOLATION OF
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A. General Background and Theories
The filing of false statements with a governmental depart-
ment or agency presents one of the most problematic areas of
venue determination. Section 1001 of Title 18, United States
Code, provides that it is a criminal offense to "make or use"
any false statement in any matter "within the jurisdiction"
of a governmental agency.8 To determine venue it is necesF
to decide whether the filing of a false statement is a sii
5. United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
6. There is no such thing as a common law crime which is recognized
by the federal courts,, although the common law of crimes can be looked
to for definition.
7. United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946).
8. 62 Stat. 749 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958) states:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully
falsifies, conceals or covers up ... a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements . .. or makes or uses any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry . . . shall be fined
... or Imprisoned .. "
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act, a continuing act or an offense which may be separated
into distinct parts. Although venue is controlled by where the
offense is committed, there is a split of authority on the ques-
tion of what is the offense under the provisions of Section
1001.
According to one view, the technical act of filing the fraud-
ulent statement is a condition precedent to the commission of
the offense since only upon filing is there "any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency" of the govern-
ment.9 All other acts leading to this filing, including the execu-
tion and mailing of the statement, are outside the jurisdiction
of the governmental agency. Thus proper venue in such cases
is only in the district of filing.
A second view would recognize that the offense must have
a beginning and that the single act of filing is not the only
element of the offense. 10 By application of the continuing
offense statute these decisions hold that venue is proper either
in the district of preparation, where the statement is executed
and mailed, or in the district where the statement is filed with
the government agency.
B. Travis v. United States
In Travis v. United States," the Supreme Court has taken
a clearly restrictive stand on the make-file issue. The Court
held that the proper district for prosecution of a violation of
the Taft-Hartley Actl 2-which made filing of non-communist
affidavits by labor union officers a prerequisite to the use of
the National Labor Relations Board-was the district of filing,
and not the district where the acts of preparation occurred.
9. United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242 (3rd Cir. 1953); United States
v. Lefkoff, 113 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); United States v. Borow,
101 F. Supp. 211 (D.N.J. 1951).
10. Henslee v. United States, 262 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
984 (1959); De Rosier v. United States, 218 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 921 (1955); Bridgeman v. United States, 140 Fed. 577 (9th Cir.
1905).
11. 364 U.S. 358 (1961).
12. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(h), 61
Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1951):
"No Investigation shall be made by the Board of any question
... raised by a labor organization . . .unless there is on file with
the Board an affidavit executed .. . by each officer of such labor
organization . . . that he is not a member of the Communist
Party or affiliated with such party ...." (Emphasis added.)
This section goes on to state that § 35(a) of the Criminal Code (now
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1001) shall be applicable in respect to such affi-
davits. (Emphasis added.)
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The circuit court in the Travis case13 held that venue was
properly laid in Colorado under the continuing offense statute;
and that venue could not be attacked on the theory that the
making or using of the affidavit was completed in Colorado
prior to the time when the matter came within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United States.
The Supreme Court in reversing this decision construed
the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act as controlling when the
matter came within the jurisdiction of an agency of the gov-
ernment. They held since filing was a condition precedent to
the use of the Board's procedures, it must also be a condition
precedent before there is a matter within the jurisdiction of
a government agency within the meaning of the false state-
ment statute.
The Travis ruling was based on United States v. Valenti,1 4
which reversed the conviction of a union leader for filing a
false non-communist affidavit with the NLRB on the ground
that the offense was committed only in the district of filing.
In reaching this conclusion the Valenti court relied on Lom-
bardo v. United States.1 5 This case determined that venue for
a willful failure to file a statement required by-statute could
only be laid in the district where the statement was to be filed.
It appears that the theory of the Lombardo case should not
be controlling in either the Valenti or Travis rulings, since the
charge in these cases is not based on the failure or omission
to perform a duty, but on the affirmative acts of executing
and mailing.";
In dissenting to the Travis holding Mr. Justice Harlan con-
sidered separately the statutes involved to determine the
nature- of the offense. The offense charged was the making
and filing of a false affidavit under the terms of the false
statement statute,1 7 which the Taft-Hartley Act applied in
13. Travis v. United'States, 247 F.2d 130, (10th Cir. 1957).
14. 207 F.2d 242 (3rd Cir. 1953).
15. Lombardo v. United States, 241 U.S. 73 (1916). Involved in this case
was the failure to file with the Commissioner of Immigration certain
information concerning an alien woman whom the defendant was harboring
for purposes of prostitution. In reply to the argument that venue could be
placed in the district where the defendant failed to mail the statement,
the Court held that the offense was not a continuing one which was jus-
ticiable in either district since the act of mailing was not filing within the
meaning of the statute.
16. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 639 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
17. 62 Stat. 749 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958). Supra note 8.
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respect to the affidavits filed. 8 The elements of the crime then
should be interpreted in accordance with the false filing stat-
ute and all that section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act does is
supply the "jurisdiction of . . . (an) agency of the United
States" required by this statute. 19 The fact that the act of
filing was necessary to complete the offense by bringing the
matter within the jurisdiction of the Board would not "detract
from the conclusion that the offense was begun when and
where the affidavit was executed. Indeed this would seem to
be the very type of situation contemplated by . . . (the con-
tinuing offense statute) .-2o
It is important to note that in the cases decided since
Valenti, regarding the application of section 1001 to the Taft-
Hartley Act, not one decision followed the conclusion as to
venue laid down in that case, with the exception of the instant
Travis case. 21 Indeed in analogous cases the courts have largely
ignored this ruling and distinguished it when possible.22
With the reaffirmation by the Travis case of the Valenti
ruling, it is submitted that both at the local and national levels,
potential future injustice may result since venue may only
be laid in the district of filing. The defendant now is required
to defend himself in the foreign district where the filing was
done. The government may not initiate the proceeding in the
18. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1951). Supra note 12.
19' Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 641 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). As stated in summary of this reasoning:
". since it is 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 which defines
the offense, § 9(h) only supplying the requisite jurisdiction of the
agency of the United States, and since by § 1001 the offense con-
sists of falsifying a material fact, making a false statement, or
making or using any false writing or document, it seems eminent-
ly reasonable to consider that the offense Is at least definitively
begun at the place where the false affidavit is actually made,
sworn and subscribed."
Note that the dissent did not distinguish the act of mailing as a possible
element of the offense, and apparently took the stand that the acts of
making and swearing to the affidavit alone are a sufficient beginning of
the offense to warrant application of the multiple-venue statute.
20. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 641 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
21. This conclusion is weakened by the fact that only two cases took
issue with the question of venue in a violation of § 9(h). A careful dis-
tinction must be made between those cases dealing with a filing at one of
the branch offices of the Board in the case of local union officers, and for
a filing in Washington, D.C. where the headquarters of the National Labor
Relations Board are located In the case of officers of -international unions.
Only the latter type case Is involved here. The two cases are: United
States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 450 (N.D. Cal. 1953) and Travis v. United
States, 247 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1957).
22. See De Rosier v. United States, 218 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); United States v. Dolan, 119 F. Supp. 309, 310(E.D.N.Y. 1954).
district of execution, and the defendant may not have the
proceeding transferred to that district.
C. Prosecution in the District of Mailing Under the
Continuing Offense Statute
Although mailing is not itself an offense which will support
venue, many cases have construed the act of knowingly mail-
ing a false statement to be filed with a governmental agency
as an affirmative beginning of events which would naturally
culminate in the commission of an offense.23 These cases allow
prosecution of the offense in the mailing district under the
continuing offense statute24 since the offense was construed
to have begun in that district. It is immaterial that the offense
is not completed until filing.
The Supreme Court in Travis expressly rejected prosecu-
tion in the district of mailing. The Court said: "Venue should
not be made to depend on the chance use of the mails, when
Congress has so carefully indicated the locus of the crime. ' ' 25
However, in De Rosier v. United States,2r the court stated that
the commission of the offense must be viewed in retrospect.
Thus, even though filing is necessary to complete the offense
the false statement should be traced back to its source where
the acts of executing and mailing took place.
In holding that venue could not be laid in the district of
mailing the Travis court relied on the dictum of the Valenti
case which implied that venue was improper in the district of
mailing. It is believed that a distinction can be made between
the Valenti case and the instant Travis case. The Valenti in-
dictment did not allege that the affidavit had been mailed
from the district of prosecution and such allegation was neces-
sary to bring the offense within the purview of the continuing
offense statute. Although the two-judge majority stated that
even a presumption of mailing would be insufficient for de-
termining venue,'2 7 one judge considered the act of mailing as
sufficient under section 3237 (a).21 He concurred with the
23. Henslee v. United States, 262 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1959): United States
v. Miller, 246 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957); De Rosier
v. United States, 218 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. ), cert. -denied, 349 U. S. 921 (1955).
24. Supra note 3.
25. 364 U.S. 631, 636 (1961).
26. 218 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1955).
27. United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1953).
28. Id. at 246. (Hastie, J., Concurring).
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majority's reversal of the conviction only on the ground that
the Government failed to prove the fact of mailing.19 The con-
curring judge has then created a locus poenitentiae during the
time of preparation when the actor has not decisively com-
mitted himself and thus would be guilty of no offense. But
upon deposit of the affidavit in the mails the affiant has
begun the offense which is clearly within the purview of the
continuing offense statute. Thus venue could be laid in the
district of mailing, as well as the district of filing.
It is submitted that to supersede the multiple-venue statute
Congress must expressly (and not impliedly or indirectly)
provide for venue of a particular offense. When an offense in
any way results, is committed or completed by use of the
mails, venue may be laid either in the district of mailing
(where most generally the preparatory acts took place and
also which is the district of residence for the defendant) or in
the district of filing.
III. PROSECUTION IN ANALOGOUS FALSE FILING CASES
Venue for false filing cannot be laid in a district where the
defendant prepared the statement and subsequently delivered
it personally to the foreign district for filing.30 It also appears
that the district wherein the defendant merely omits to pre-
pare a statement required by law will not support venue.3
1
This latter conclusion was recently contravened and venue
was held to be the district where the defendant resided. The
court reasoned that the offense of failure to file continues
where the defendant is personally present.3 2
In cases where there has been a mailing of illicit matter to
a foreign district, the decisions are unsettled whether prose-
29. See Note, Federal Venue Requirements and Prosecutions for False
Filing, 63 Yale L.J. 426, 427 (1954) (criticism of Valenti decision).
30. Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938); United States v.
Borow, 101 F. Supp. 211 (DN.J. 1951).
31. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916); New York Central &
H.R. . Co. v. United States, 166 Fed. 267 (2d Cir. 1908). This rule has been
extended to violations of the Selective Training and Service Act. Johnston
v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956); Jones v. Pescor, 169 F.2d 853 (8th
Cir. 1948).
32. United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). In apply-
ing § 3237(a) the district judge stated:
"Failure to make application being negative in nature, It Is
difficult to ascertain its beginning or completion. However, for
present purposes it is reasonable to say that it continues where
the defendant is personally present and where he resides so long
as the application is not made."
[Vol. 38
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cution can be had in the mailing district. Venue for violation
of the Mail Fraud Statute 33 was restricted by an early ruling
that only the act of depositing the matter was an offense.4
More recent decisions have allowed prosecution either in the
district of deposit or delivery on the basis of the multiple-
venue statute.
35
In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Johnson36 construed the Federal Denture Act as
making the offense the act of depositing the dentures. Con-
gress reacted by broadening the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
3237 (a) to allow prosecution either in the district of deposit
or delivery.3 7 It appears from the instant Travis case and a
number of other decisions that the courts have evaded the im-
plied intent and import of the Congressional attack on the
Johnson decision.3 A large number of cases do apparently
recognize this liberal intent and have adopted it when apply-
ing section 3237 (a) to filing offenses involving the use of the
mails.9
In a recent series of cases involving violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act,40 section 3237 (a) was liberally interpreted.
In one decision it was held that even though the rules des-
ignated the place for filing, this would not preclude prosecu-
33. 62 Stat. 763 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1341: (1958).
34. United States v. Sauer, 88 Fed. 249 (W.D. Mich. 1898). See, e.g.,
Horner v. United States, 143 U.S. 207 (1892); United States v. Conrad, 59
Fed. 458 (D.W.Va. 1894); United States v. Comerford, 25 Fed. 902 (W.D.
Tex. 1885).
35. Kreuter v. United States, 218 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 932 (1955). See, e.g., Palliser v. United States, 136 U.S. 257 (1890);
Andre v. United States, 16 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1827).
36. 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
37. 62 Stat. 826 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1958). Congress added the
provision that:
"Any offense involving the use of the mails . . . is a continuing
offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment
of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district
from, through, or into which such commerce or mail matter
moves."
The revision notes to this section state:
"The revised section removes all doubt as to the venue of
continuing offenses and makes unnecessary special venue pro-
visions except in cases where Congress desires to restrict the
prosecution of offenses to particular districts . 80th Congress,
House Report No. 304.
38. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961); United States v. Valenti,
207 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir.
1953); United States v. Lefkoff, 113 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), this
decision in effect being reversed by United States v. United States District
Court, 209 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1954).
39. United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Henslee v.
United States, 262 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Miller, 246
F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957); De Rosier v. United
States, 218 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955).
40. See 15 U.S.C. ch. 2B (1958).
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tion in the district of preparation since an equally important
element along with filing is the ingredient of falsity.41 United
States v. Olen 2 held that a special venue provision in the Se-
curities Act allowing prosecution either in the district of
transmission or in the district of receipt did not restrict
venue. The court may allow a transfer under Rule 21 (b) and
section 3237 (a) to a third district which is the defendant's
district of residence wherein the books of the corporation were
maintained, and which was the place of inception of the al-
leged false information. This rule applied even though neither
the specified act of transmission nor receipt took place in the
transferee district. It appears here the court bent over back-
wards to construe the offense as having begun in the resident
district to allow transfer under Rule 21 (b), and thus to avoid
the auxiliary venue provisions in the Act itself. This is an
interesting if not useful judicial interpretation which allows
a general venue statute to supersede the specific venue pro-
visions within a criminal statute. The fate of this ruling awaits
future litigation.
The mailing of false income tax returns for filing in a
foreign district raises a problem of venue determination due
to the lack of any specific venue provision in the income tax
law.43 A failure to file an income tax return may only be pros-
ecuted in the district where the return was to be filed and not
where it could have been prepared or forwarded for filing.44
Several cases have avoided this rule by construing the indict-
ment as not charging the failure to pay the tax, but instead
charging the attempt to evade and defeat the payment of the
tax.4 5 Venue is then in the district where the acts transpire
which cause the tax to be incurred.
In United States v. Lefkoff46 the court, located in the dis-
trict of preparation and mailing, refused to accept a transfer
of the case under Rule 21 (b) from the court in the district of
41. United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
42. 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See United States v. Cashin, 281
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1960).
43. 68A Stat. 851 (1954), 26 U.S.C. 7201 (1958) provides:
"Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade
or defeat any tax imposed by this title or payment thereof shall,
. . be guilty of a felony ....
44. United States v. Yarborough, 16 F.R.D. 212 (D. Md. 1954).
45. Beach v. United States, 240 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Reynolds v.
United States, 225 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955), reh.
denied, 350 U.S. 929 (1956).
46. 113 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
[Vol. 38
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filing. In a subsequent application for mandamus to compel
the court to accept the transfer of the case, the Sixth Circuit
Court granted this relief and deemed the offense to have been
committed in both districts.4 7 This decision has been used ex-
tensively as authority for allowing prosecution in the district
of preparation under 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (a) .4s
Probably because of the split of authority that followed the
Lefkoff decision,49 Congress enacted an amendment to 18
U.S.C.§ 3237 in 1958 which guaranteed to a tax evader the
right of election to be prosecuted in the district of his resi-
dence.50 In the first decision to apply the amendment a motion
to transfer under the statute was denied due to a technical
question of delay in making the motion.51 The court expressly
gave leave to the defendant to renew a motion to transfer
under Rule 21 (b) if a bill of particulars was furnished by the
government showing that offenses were committed in the resi-
dent district.52
The court in the Fifth Circuit held recently that an indict-
ment may initially be brought in the defendant's home district
wherein the fraudulent preparation and mailing took place,
47. United States v. United States District Court, 209 F.2d 575 (6th Cir.
1954). The dissenting judge contended that 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) would not
apply since it provides only for the institution and not removal of pro-
ceedings in a district where the offense was begun, and that removal pro-
ceedings under Rule 21(b) are "dependent upon the offense being com-
mitted in both districts."
48. Kowalsky v. United States, 290 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 875 (1961); Ashe v. United States, 288 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1961); Beaty
v. United States, 213 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1954), vacated per curlom, 348 U.S.
905, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 946, reh. denied, 350 U.S. 855 (1955).
49. Compare United States v. Aaron, 117 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. W. Va. 1953);
United States v. Wyman, 125 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Mo. 1954); United States
v. Warring, 121 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1954); with United States v. Gross, 276
F.2d 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831 (1960); United States v. Hoover,
233 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 840 (1956); United States v.
Albanese, 117 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 224 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 845 (1955).
50. 62 Stat. 826 (1958) 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1958). The statute provides
in part:
"... where an offense involves use of the mails and is an offense
... and prosecution is begun in a judicial district other than thejudicial district in which the defendant resides, he may upon
motion . . . elect to be tried in the district in which he was resid-
Ing at the time the alleged offense was committed. Provided, that
the motion is filed within twenty days after arraignment of the
defendant upon indictment or information."
51. United States v. Abrams, 166 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 260 F.2d 892 (2nd Cir. 1958). Court denied motion to transfer
under the new amendment since thirty-five days rather than the twenty
days had elapsed after arraignment. The Court rejected defendant's excuse
that where the arraignment occurred prior to the effective date of the
statute, the motion, as filed here, should be filed within twenty days of
the statute's effective date.
52. Compare United States v. Abrams, supra note 51, with United States
v. Aaron, 117 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. W. Va. 1953) which would appear opposite
to the strict interpretation given the tax evasion offense by the latter
court. See United States v. Kimble, 186 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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notwithstanding the fact that the return was filed in a foreign
district. 5 3 A similar conclusion was also reached in the Sixth
Circuit when it supported a transfer under Federal Rule 21 (b)
from the district of filing to the district of preparation.54 The
indictment in this case had been supplemented by a bill of
particulars which showed where the tax returns were signed,
and where the acts relied upon to show fraudulent intent had
been committed. The court held that even when the indictment
charges the filing of a fraudulent income tax which is an
offense only in the district of filing, it does not preclude a
transfer under Rule 21 (b) to the district of preparation when
a subsequent bill of particulars is filed. These two latest venue
decisions appear to be a conclusive answer to any objection
against prosecution in the district of preparation and mail-
ing when the defendant through inadvertant delay fails to
make a proper motion for transfer to his district ot residence
under section 3237 (b).
IV. CONCLUSION
In the absence of special venue provisions for false filing
offenses, it would seem from the Travis rule that both parties
are denied the choice of litigating in the district of preparation
and mailing. Restricting prosecution to the district of filing
on the basis of technical completion of the offense in that dis-
trict appears to impose an unnecessary limitation on both the
Government and the defendant. Since the filing district is
usually different and may be at great distance from the de-
fendant's district of preparation and mailing, it is doubtful
that the Congressional intent was to compel the defendant
to defend himself, often at great expense and inconvenience,
in the foreign district of filing.55 Indeed, the drafters of the
Constitution sought to guarantee a trial in the defendant's
home area close to his evidence and friends. A denial of such
right would appear to be in conflict with these constitutional
provisions. 6
53. Kowalsky v. United States, 290 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 875 (1961).
54. Ashe v. United States, 288 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1961).
55. See Note, 63 Yale L.J. 426, 429 (1954), which points out that there
are twenty states that have fewer tax districts than judicial districts.
(North Dakota is not in this group). Other examples may be seen where
there is one governmental agency designed to serve a large geographical
area. This area often extends into several states as well as several Judi-
cial districts. In these situations difficulty may arise by required prosecu-
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In view of the Congressional attack on the restrictive hold-
ing of the Supreme Court in United States v. Johnson, -5 and
the Congressional reaction to the conflict between the courts
as to the venue of the offense of filing false income tax re-
turns,58 it would seem that the Supreme Court has taken a
backward step in the Travis ruling.
Because of the decisions of many lower courts allowing
prosecution in either the district of mailing or filing under
the multiple-venue statute, it is believed that the scope of the
Travis ruling will be limited to cases involving false affidavits
required to be filed as a condition precedent to the use of the
services of some governmental agency. This narrow applica-
tion of the Travis decision can be justified on the basis of the
unique wording in the Taft-Hartley Act making filing a con-
dition precedent to the use of the facilities of the Labor Rela-
tions Board. Since the Supreme Court narrowly construed this
to require a filing before there was a matter within the juris-
diction of a government agency, it is submitted that future
false filing cases can be distinguished on this basis.
However, if Travis is widely followed, Congress again will
have to modify section 3237 to specifically allow prosecution
either in the district of preparation and mailing or in the dis-
trict of filing.
JOHN F. STONE
tion In the district of filing rather than in the district of preparation and
mailing. This often will necessitate great expense to transport lawyers,
witnesses, records and other evidence to the foreign district of filing. See
United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544 (D. Neb. 1950).
56. See United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1937), aff'd, 103
F.2d 857 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939).
57. Supra note 36.
58. Supra note 50.
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